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I. INTRODUCTION
In keeping with the theme of the LatCrit XIV Conference, “Outsiders
Inside: Critical Outsider Theory and Praxis in the Policymaking of the New
American Regime,” I present a mathematically inspired critique of legal
analysis and propose importing the number system into the legal
503
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conception of the person. My approach substitutes the prevailing
definitions of natural and artificial persons that pervade the empire of the
law1 with numerical analysis. Once the law uses a number analysis to
define conceptions of the person, a new set of building blocks is needed to
audit legal analysis. This will empower the Nouveau Régime to audit2
“insiders” and “outsiders” theories as well as praxis and policymaking in
the justice system.
My proposal is a “thought-piece” outlining the foundations of my
research program. I do not have all the answers to this “thought-piece,” but
I am offering a new perspective to the study and analysis of law. I hope
that it can be a guide for others who will improve on and promote it. The
structure of this proposal integrates questions, hypothesis, predictions,
observation, experiments, and final statements, all basic elements of the
scientific method.
These elements of the scientific method are not rigorously followed in
law as done in traditional scientific fields because the justice system has
not yet adopted a standard scientific protocol. In the absence of juridical
scientific protocol I will include the basic elements without attempting to
ignore the particular complexity of the justice system by following a
protocol of another field. I will refer to “insider/outsider,” audit and
Régime in accordance to the definitions I now develop.
First, by “outsiders” I refer to critical outsider scholarship, LatCritical
values, including internationalism and global-mindedness, the valorization
of human rights and multidimensional diversity, the centrality of
antidiscrimination work, a commitment to rigorous interrogation of
longstanding dominant assumptions and norms, and a preference for
discourse and dialogue over militarism. All are characteristics shared by
President Barack H. Obama as a biracial former law professor with
working class and immigrant roots and an international and multicultural
upbringing.
Second, by “audit” within the context of the justice system, I borrow
from its traditional development in accounting, in which a natural or
juridical person is financially evaluated procedurally and substantively
using quantitative and qualitative methods to ascertain the validity and
reliability of its information, as well as an assessment of internal control. I
support expanding the scope of an audit to the local and global security
matters the justice system addresses, such as, risks to life, property and
liberty. At the present, the justice system has not implemented any official
1. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS’S EMPIRE (1986).
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY WITH PRONUNCIATIONS 131 (6th ed. 1990)

(identifying an audit as the “systematic inspection of accounting records involving
analyses, tests, and confirmations”).
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and formal external/independent and/or internal auditing mechanism that
may verify the effectiveness of the quality of the justice system. I propose
a conceptualization of audit that also borrows from “quality audits” to
verify the existence of objective evidence to assess the success of processes
in the justice system and in the achievement of fundamental rights. I hope
the product of this type of audit reports irregularities as well as suggests
corrective trends by highlighting areas of good practice. An ambitious but
essential subject of analysis of audits in the justice system should be the
exercise of discretion in the analysis of facts and in the interpretation of the
law at all levels: from the particular natural and/or juridical persons
involved in a conflict; to all types of law enforcers involved, such as: police
and administrative officials, governmental and private attorneys’ in their
respective roles; law and rule makers, such as: legislators and agency
directors; and adjudicators, such as: judges of the judicial branch and quasijudicial administrative agencies of all levels at federal and state level.
Third, by “Régime” I refer to the form of government―the set of rules,
cultural or social norms, that regulates the operation of government and its
interactions with society as may be developed by the “outsiders” that have
become “insiders,” such as can be epitomized in the aspirations and
promises of President Barack H. Obama’s campaign.
After presenting this mathematical critique and proposal, I hope the
reader will acquire a new perspective on how the search for auditing
methods will enable us all, both “insiders” and “outsiders,” to measure the
execution of the justice system with more reliability than in the present
Régime.
As Dean Claudio Grossman of The American University Washington
College of Law stated regarding the force of an audit during the closing
reception of the LatCrit XIV Conference, “auditing is like pregnancy; you
can’t have a 5% pregnancy; either you’re pregnant or you’re not.”
II. CONDITIONS CREATING NEED FOR THIS MODEL: OBSERVATIONS,
QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
A. From Leibniz to Modern Science: Parameters for a Theory of Legal
Analysis
This new perspective follows in the steps of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646-1716), a jurist who created calculus in his journey towards universal
truth for solving disputes. I believe that if Leibniz lived today he would be
surprised to see that, three centuries after his death, legal analysis has failed
to incorporate his contributions and remains in a similar state in which he
left it. During the 1900s, jurists failed to make substantial mathematical
contributions to the analysis of law that serves “insiders” and “outsiders”
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directly. It has been non-jurists such as Gary S. Becker and Ronald H.
Coase, both Nobel Prize winners, who have made leaps in furthering the
legacy of Leibniz through their economic and mathematical applications to
legal analysis and the justice system.3
I suggest we honor Leibniz’s legacy and continue the application of the
mathematical approach to conflict. Mathematical contributions do not
clearly carry the imprint of their author, whereas works of art, similar to the
jurisprudence of a particular court or judge, are distinctly marked by the
style and individuality of the artist. Mathematicians from different places,
times, and systems, working sometimes with different methods of proof,
get the same results and arrive at the same theorems. Mathematics
possesses an objective character that is dissociated from a scientist making
discoveries, unlike artistic or literary works, which are subjective and
reflect the personalities of their creators. The objective nature of
mathematics more easily leads to teamwork, whereas it is generally harder
for two or more people to collaborate on a painting, novel, or legal dispute.
Jurists fail to understand that if one of our basic duties is to measure and
determine, at different stages, the likelihood of actions or omissions of
persons and their effects, then determination of likelihood in turn will
require measurement, and measurements require numbers. How can
society audit the justice system and the abilities of its agents to make
determinations of fault in prosecuting criminal cases or pursuing civil
actions if they are deficient in math and lack external methods of
measurement and analysis?
The Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) movement and its progeny identified
weaknesses of the justice system that perpetuate patterns of subordination
and exclusion of “outsiders.”4 As “outsiders” we can perceive that the
actual Régime has weaknesses that are the product of the pseudoscientific
nature of a justice system that promotes exclusion of “outsiders.” This
pseudoscientific nature creates complexities through high entropy, noise,
and chaos which make it easier for the Régime to perpetuate a justice
system that preaches independence as an autonomous science and promotes
patterns of subordination.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing in the late nineteenth century, was one
of the first American legal scholars to highlight the detrimental effects of a
3. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971)
(analyzing the effects of race, sex, and social class, among other factors, on the
marketplace); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960) (sparking the theories of Law and Economics, which have lead to new
perspectives in legal analysis that rely on math).
4. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Legal Reform and Social Justice, An Introduction
to LatCrit Theory, Praxis and Community, 14 GRIFFITH L. REV. 148 (2005) (defining
concepts such as “outsider perspective,” “substantive security,” “patterns of
subordination,” and “multidimensional” within the evolution of LatCrit Theory).
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pseudoscientific justice system. Holmes publicly emphasized a pragmatic
legal analysis in his book The Common Law, through his famous phrase,
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”5 In his
address, The Path of the Law, Holmes indicated that the jurist should rely
on personal experience while navigating in the justice system, or view the
system from what he called the “bad man” perspective.6 Jurists who
navigate the justice system often end up relying on their experience and not
the black letter law; those who do not have the sensibility to recognize the
reality of the system and do not rely on their experience, struggle and fail to
excel.
Finding a solution to the weaknesses revealed by Holmes and
subsequently developed by “legal realists,” extends to the highest level of
our justice system. Both Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin Scalia
of the United States Supreme Court acknowledge this crisis and propose
forms of analysis that aspire to show the path for equitable distribution and
opportunities for “outsiders.”7 However, these justices, like those of
various critical legal scholars and other jurists have a similar problem: they
fail to recognize that they are children of a pseudoscience. As children of a
pseudoscience, they are victims of processes that impair their openness to
mathematical contributions, such as audits, in legal analysis under a
Nouveau Régime. Jurists of the past were more interdisciplinary but had
another limitation: they did not have the benefit of modern sciences. The
contributions of modern sciences, such as complexity theory, have made it
possible to surpass many of the hurdles classical science presented.
Modern science within our context begins with Albert Einstein’s (18791955) introduction of the Theory of Relativity in 1905, upon which Werner
Heisenberg (1901-1976) developed his “uncertainty principle” governing
the subatomic world and the foundations of quantum mechanics, which
were also being entertained by a cluster of scientists.8 These contributions
undermined the certainty of absolute space and time that Isaac Newton
5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1963)
(1881).
6. See Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., at the
dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law: The Path of the
Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (arguing that “bad men”
should only care about the material consequences of actions).
7. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 116 (2005) (highlighting the fear that
judges, in justifying legal conclusions with reference to real-world consequences, might
act subjectively and undemocratically); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 14 (1997) (lamenting the lack of an intelligible theory of statutory
interpretation through which judges may view each case).
8. The international group of physicists that helped develope these concepts in the
1920s included: Niels Bohr from Denmark, Louis De Broglie from France, Erwin
Schrodinger and Wolfgang Pauli from Austria, Werner Heisenberg from Germany, and
Paul Dirac from England.
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(1642-1727) and Pierre-Simon De Laplace (1749-1827) idealized under
their mechanistic view of nature’s unconditional determinism. Because of
these contributions, science is no longer exact, and the scientific
community has had to recognize that most of their explanations for future
events will depend on recognition of general patterns and probabilities. As
such, they have modified their language. For example, established
scientific principles traditionally referred to as “laws” are now referred to
as “theories.”9
This new rationality was reinforced in the field of mathematics by the
contribution of Kurt Gödel (1906-1978).
Gödel developed the
“incompleteness theorem,” also known as “Gödel’s Proof” or “Gödel’s
Theorem.” Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem states that a consistent and
non-contradictory arithmetical system invariably contains “undecidable”
propositions—mathematical statements of which we can never determine
to be true or false. We cannot prove that a system is consistent and noncontradictory solely on the basis of the axioms contained within that
system; this can only be done by stepping out of the system and imposing
additional external axioms. In this sense, the system is incomplete by
itself. Hence, total truth cannot be contained within a finite system;10
therefore, any finite system is by nature incomplete. This “incompleteness
theory” implies that rational thought has inherent limitations and cannot
attain absolute truth.11
Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem established a new era in which any
model of natural phenomena would appear inherently relative, uncertain,
and incomplete (together “RUI parameters”). The impact of the RUI
parameters in all analysis will vary in accordance to the micro or macro,
basic or complex, scale of the phenomena under study. Hence, the best we
can do in all fields of knowledge and analysis, including the law, is to
identify connections, patterns, and trends, recognizing they will never be
static, certain, or complete. In other words, one hundred percent exactness
is a fallacy. These three main contributions had been elusive throughout
different fields of knowledge, and it was the use of math that helped each
of these great scholars to make outstanding contributions in the

9. See FRITJOF CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 41 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that all
models and theories are approximate and not completely certain); JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 3 (1987) (explaining that chaos theory originates
from where the laws of nature end and fail to explain the randomness events seen in
many areas of the physical universe).
10. See ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GÖDEL’S PROOF 86 (1958)
(declaring that arithmetic axioms are incomplete and that all arithmetical truths cannot
be deducted from axioms).
11. Id.
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understanding of ourselves, and our environment.
With these three fundamental RUI parameters, I invite you on a brief
exploratory journey of how the existing Régime of legal analysis in the
justice system exploits these limitations in favor of “insiders.” Under a
Nouveau Régime, we can apply math as Einstein, Heisenberg, and Gödel
did in their respective fields, and discover connections, trends, and patterns
in the dynamics of nature. This proposal for a Nouveau Régime seeks to
discover such connections, trends, and patterns in the dynamics of legal
analysis in the justice system.
Therefore, by implementing basic mathematical elements in legal
analysis we will generate data for auditing the justice system and its role in
the flow of “insiders” and “outsiders,” as well as any of the infinite
amounts of classes that may be rising or falling. Auditing will help us
understand the spatial and temporal dynamic of the Régime and will make
us aware of its trajectory and force in order to get ready for it, just like
when a meteorologist helps us understand the spatial and temporal
dynamics of an atmospheric event. When a meteorologist tries to forecast
the flow in time and space of atmospheric clusters, such as storms and
hurricanes, she uses math as a tool to model the trajectory and power of this
phenomena, to allow all in its path a chance to plan ahead to mitigate
losses. However, in order to reach this goal we must surpass the hurdle
that the pseudoscientific nature of the justice system presents.
B. A View of the Justice System: Pseudoscience and Scientism
Pseudoscience is any body of knowledge, methodology, or practice
erroneously considered scientific. The definition and characteristics of a
pseudoscience in first instant may be implicitly attributed to Johannes
Kepler (considered by many to be the first astronomer) and Galileo Galilei,
but Sir Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994) originally established it during
the 1950s. More recent scholars, such as Philip Kitcher (1947- ), define it
by its motives and methodologies, instead of the content of its theories.12
In other words, it is not the doctrine itself, it is how the doctrine justifies
and perpetuates “insider” status.
However, the characteristics used for the demarcation exercise presented
in the present paper could not be attributed to any single person, since there
are many persons that have reiterated and adapted to their fields the list of
characteristics that make a field more reliable and legitimate without citing

12. See Robert MacDougall, Strange Enthusiasms: A Brief History of American
(Winter
1999),
available
at
Pseudoscience,
3.4
21STC,
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/21stC/issue-3.4/macdougall.html (noting that Kitcher felt
that pseudoscience thrives because it is quick to appeal to the democratic sensibilities
of people, rather than letting the theory be judged on its merits).
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any source or expressing any claim of authorship or copyright. Thus, I am
unable to credit any particular person with sole authority.
A pseudoscience cannot comply with the criteria of a science and the
lists of characteristics are neither exclusive nor conclusive independently of
each other; however, the more characteristics present in a field of study, the
more suspicious one should be when considering it.13 For example,
pseudosciences that enjoy vitality, acceptance, and, in some cases, renewed
interest within popular culture, are astrology, witchcraft, and
parapsychology (study of UFOs). My claim is that legal analysis in the
present Régime is nothing more than a pseudoscience.
Society confronts substantial risks when the system accepts
pseudoscience norms without critique, as seen in the field of certain
modalities of alternative medicine. Sick people visit these pseudoscientific
healers and frequently leave erroneously convinced they were healed. The
mind is very powerful in achieving health, but this is no justification for
misleading patients into neglecting legitimate medical treatment. When
these patients later discover they were not truly healed, their condition may
have already worsened to the extent that modern medical treatment is often
ineffective. Today, legal analysis within the justice system produces
similar results, in that it generates the appearance of effective justice, when
in reality it is a system immune from standard auditing actively promoting
confusion and arbitrariness that furthers the preferences of “insiders.”
Governments, industries, and other interest groups use pseudoscience to
push their particular agendas and to confer a sense of legitimacy. The U.S.
government through its Legislative Branch generates law; through its
Executive Branch generates Presidential Orders, treaties, and regulations;
and through its Judiciary Branch generates jurisprudence. Most of its
members are “insiders” promoting pseudo-scientific ideas of selfpreservation that they pass onto the population at large, the “outsiders.”
Policy formulated in this fashion is generally insulated from criticism, even
13. Professionals of different branches of knowledge have made their own list of
characteristics with slight adaptations relative to their fields; however, they all
essentially propose the same. See DANIEL R. ALTSCHULER ET. AL., CIENCIA,
PSEUDOCIENCIA Y EDUCACIÓN (Callejón Editions ed., 2004); ROBERT L. PARK,
VOODOO SCIENCE (2000); CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD (1996);
MICHAEL SHERMER, WHY PEOPLE BELIEVE WEIRD THINGS (2002); M. Bunge, What is
Pseudoscience?, 9 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER 36 (1984); William F. McComas, Ten Myths of
Science; Reexamining What We Think We Know. . ., 96 SCH. SCI. & MATH 10 (1996),
available at http://bluffton.edu/~bergerd/NSC_111/TenMyths.html; Larry Orcutt, Bad
Science or, Some Lists Useful in Dealing With Questionable Science, CATCHPENNY
MYSTERIES OF ANCIENT EGYPT EXPLAINED, http://www.catchpenny.org/patho.html
(last visited May 27, 2010); see also Keith Abney, Naturalism and Nonteological
Science: A Way to Resolve the Demarcation Problem Between Science and NonScience,
48
PSCF
162
(September
1997),
available
at
http://www.asa3.org/ASA/topics/Philosophy/ PSCF9-97Abney.html (noting that some
of these characteristics include independent testability, unification, and fecundity).
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if there are minor exceptions. If we permit such policy insulation and
immunity, then the “insiders’” policy becomes impossible to falsify, as it
does not accept conditions that may debilitate it, nor external facts that
refute it.
The immunity generated by a pseudoscience bares an
unreasonable risk: when promoted in the political system, it has justified
atrocities in the name of racial purity and national security; when promoted
in fields of study, it has eliminated legitimate methods of study and reduced
sensibility.14 If the justice system keeps following trends of a
pseudoscience to seek immunity from criticism, we will experience
unbearable levels of disparity and deprivation of fundamental rights.
The classification of a field within a science or a pseudoscience involves
ethical and political implications that touch existing institutions,15 and
intellectuals familiar with the importance of demarcating the different
existing fields differ as to which fields are pseudoscience, while people that
ignore the importance of demarcation rarely distinguish between a field
that is scientific or pseudoscientific.16
I now develop three characteristics used to help identify and demarcate a
field as pseudoscience to the justice system, as follows:
1. Legislators, executives, and jurists formulate laws, rules, and
jurisprudence without a scientific methodology but co-opt the image of
using one.17 On occasion, they pre-select the science they consider relevant
to justify their objectives while excluding the science that contradicts them.
Jurists do the same when they prejudge data as “correct” based on their
interest in their exercise of credibility and interpretation of the law ignoring

14. See generally JOHN CORNWELL, HITLER’S SCIENTISTS: SCIENCE, WAR AND THE
DEVIL’S PACT (2003) (examining the ethical, political, and scientific reasons behind the
choices of scientists in Hitler’s Germany).
15. See generally IRME LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
PROGRAMMES (John Worarall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978) (outlining the relative
perspectives of the “demarcation problem” in the philosophy and history of science,
especially the problem normative methodology has with distinguishing a science from
a pseudoscience).
16. A pseudoscience distinguishes from revelation, theology or spirituality by
claiming understanding, shrewdness, and legitimacy in the world through scientific
methods. Systems that rely on divine and inspirational thought are not pseudoscientific if they do not attempt to be scientific or replace well-established scientific
principles. Hence, we do not demarcate as a pseudoscience religious practices based
on faith to the extent they do not proclaim legitimacy on science and its methods to
increase the number of followers and members.
17. See Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay of Law and the
Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266 (1989) (suggesting that attention to
the principles of scientific inquiry is one method of improving the validity of legal
decisions and theories); John Veilleux, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967
(1987) (investigating the usefulness and validity of a scientific approach to legal
analysis); Vittorio Villa, Legal Science Between Natural and Human Sciences, 4
LEGAL STUD. 243, 243-44 (1984) (discussing the scientific method and its application
and interpretation in the field of law).
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all other data that contradicts their determination. Since facts and law have
the potential of infinite amount of interpretations under the present legal
analysis, they avoid verification and falsifiability. For example, one party
may present twenty witnesses and the other two, but the judge may
determine not to give credibility to the twenty and instead credit to the
other two based on her personal assessment. Nevertheless, the jurist that
presented the twenty witnesses may have genuinely given credibility to all
of them based on different criteria. What is the standard criterion to give
more weight to one witness over twenty, or to give twenty witnesses more
weight over one witness? What are the standard guidelines and instructions
for a witnesses’ demeanor to be measured and adjudicated? Does it all rely
on a hunch?
2. The justice system develops processes guided toward favoring a
product “x” or a position “y.”18 If we present an issue before two jurists,
we may have completely different and incompatible results at all levels of
the system. People cannot rely on the black letter law alone to provide a
remedy to their problems19 while failing to measure what degree of entropy
is optimal and convenient within the justice system. To illustrate this
notion, imagine we take a copy of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 1984
Edition, which consists of 947 doubled-sided pages without appendix. If
we unbind that Code and throw all the 947 pages in the air, and then gather
the loose sheets into a neat pile and examine the stack, you will notice that
the pages will be enormously more likely out of order than in order. We all
have a hunch for this. There are many ways in which the order of the pages
can be jumbled, but only one way for the order to be in the original precise
sequence. To be in order, of course, the pages must be arranged precisely
as one, two, three, four, five, six . . . up to 947. Any other arrangement is
out of order. A simple but essential observation is that, all else being equal,
the more ways something can happen, the more likely it is that it will
happen. And if something can happen in enormously more ways, like the
pages landing in the wrong numerical order, it is enormously more likely
that it will happen.20 Similarly, the more jurists, facts, and norms we have

18. See Frederick Seitz, The Present Danger to Science and Society, 1995 COSMOS
J. 2, available at http://www.cosmos-club.org/web/journals/1995/seitz/html (arguing
that modern science is not a pursuit of knowledge but rather a system of ambiguous
ideals devised by a group of insiders who use them to further their own individual goals
at the expense of society).
19. The decline of law’s autonomy with the boom of disciplines that are
complementary to law, particularly economics and philosophy. See generally Richard
A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 767 (1987).
20. Orlando I. Martínez-García, It’s Time for a Change . . . Reduction of Entropy in
Legislative Branch Through: Unicameralism, Caps and Methods, LEY & FORO, 10
Num. 2 (2007).
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involved in a conflict the more entropy and chaos we have.
3. The justice system seeks legitimacy through history and quantity. For
example, if expressed in the Constitution, stated by a founding father or
mother, or a prestigious person, people assume that it must be legitimate.
If others ratify or reiterate the expression on multiple occasions, such as
lawyers and judges do with jurisprudence, then it must be legitimate
(quantity over quality). The system may perpetuate a false or illegitimate
purpose if an important person said it a long time ago and others repeated it
later. This is precisely the problem with the school of interpretation known
as Originalism, which in constitutional law consists on the claim that the
text of the Constitution and the original intent of the framers ought to
This sense of antiquity and
control constitutional interpretation.21
reiteration is then supported with symbols of authority, such as a judge’s
dress code making them look as supernatural with their gowns, reinforced
through the structure and organization of the courtrooms, which, on many
occasions, are similar to those of the church and ancient temple.22
These characteristics show the path for further analysis in the
demarcation of the justice system as a pseudoscience and scientism.
However, any demarcation analysis is incomplete if the characteristics of a
science are not known; moreover, the gap created by the pseudoscientific
nature of the system needs to be assessed with auditing tools. Specifically,
law school curricula and other “insider” institutions that portray legal
analysis as a science.23 If legal analysis is a science, why then is math
excluded from its study? Aren’t math and science as the two wings of a
21. See JOHN H. GARVEY, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF AND DANIEL A. FARBER,
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 91-125 (5th ed. 2004). In these pages
essays of Robert Bork’s supporting this position is included, while essays of Paul Brest
offer both a practical and a normative critique of this view and Richard Kay provides
responses to the prevailing criticisms of original intentions adjudication as being
impossible and normatively objectionable. Id. at 91.
22. See Charles T. Goodsell, Bureaucratic Manipulation of Physical Symbols: An
Empirical Study, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 79 (1977) (concluding that variations of physical
symbols of bureaucracy exist based on the means of various organizational output roles
and their hypothesized link with the comparative frequency of authority symbols on
one hand and service symbols on the other). For example, the police, with a law
enforcement mentality, play the role of wielder of authority; thus, their offices have
fewer windows and hard chairs. Public health officials are by contrast, in a “helping”
profession; thus, their offices tend to have plants, vending machines and waiting room
reading material.
23. See, e.g., Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The
Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980)
(describing how law to Langdell was an applied empirical science that unfolded case
by case); Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1978) (noting how the “scientific” methods of accumulating
knowledge was applied to the field of law); Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of
Legal Science, 631 COLUM. L. REV 925 (1931) (commentating on the growing
scientific inquisitiveness as to the underlying reasoning and foundations of
contemporary legal scholarship and thought).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010

11

MARTÍNEZ-GARCÍA 08/15/10

11/11/2010 6:10:00 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7

514

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 18:3

bird?
Some scholars in the legal field have identified the combination of law
and science in fields such as “Law and Economics” and “Law and
Biology” with scientism, a concept that shares the characteristics of a
pseudoscience. The proposal herein made will depart from scientism by
importing to legal analysis elementary methods and tools used in the
sciences for developing and understanding any hypothesis and theory,
without promoting any particular hypothesis or theory over another as in
ideological explanations.24 Therefore, instead of promoting any particular
theory of economics, biology, or other field, the proposal here uses only the
tools shared by these fields in making findings and developing theories.25
Hence, this proposal is about using science as a process of discovery,
unlike pseudoscience or scientism, where individuals use science as a
talisman instead of a tool. Scientism is merely a justification, a prop, for
what you think you already know, not a critical probe as in science.26
C. The Dark Age of the Law
A complete analysis of why the legal establishment has for the most part
excluded mathematics from legal methodology requires a historical
analysis that exceeds the scope of this work. Such a historical perspective
would need to consider whether the existing method of the justice system
arose from a scientific vocation and transformed into a pseudoscience due
to the prevailing hegemonies or, if to the contrary, began as pseudoscience
and is in the process of becoming science. Richard A. Posner (1939- ) has
shared his impression regarding how the justice system developed into a
field of itself, a monopoly under the appearance of a legal science,27 relying
on a writing of Sir Edward Coke that illustrates the pretext of “insiders” to
preserve the status quo:
[T]he King said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and
that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was
answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with
24. See generally James E. Herget, The Scientific Study of Law: A Critique, 24
JURIMETRICS J. 99 (1984) (comparing the various scientific explanations of law ).
25. See George L. Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on
Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284, 1293 (1981) (arguing that the law should be
methodically explained using whatever scientific techniques are available).
26. See William Dugger, UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS xix-xxii, n.18 (1992); see
also Charles R. P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the
Regulation of the Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, n.76 (2002) (discussing
the distinctions between the fundamental laws of physics and the fundamental models
that can be interpolated from such laws, and the phenomenological and statistical
models used in economics and finance theory which at best only permit extrapolations).
27. See Posner, supra note 19, at 766-77 (describing how the lack of political
consensus and the growing use of complementary sciences in the study of law has
started shifting the foundations of legal autonomy and rationale).
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excellent science, and great endowments of nature: but His Majesty was
not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which
concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are
not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason and judgment
of law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience,
before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it: and that the law was
the golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects; and
which protected his Majesty in safety and peace . . . .28

This statement shows how jurists developed a technocratic field to avoid
the King’s (Executive’s) involvement in law. These “insiders” solidified
their status and developed the idea that the law is not natural, but artificial,
in order to avoid criticism. They preserved their hegemony by detouring
from natural physical laws and instead embracing their human ideas.
Subsequently, Christopher Columbus Langdell (1826-1906) in 1870
converted that autonomous field of legal analysis into an intellectual idea
that spread as the leading paradigm of order and preservation of “insider”
status.29 Members of the justice system, through the case method, need
only study their own opinions independently of the existence of other fields
of knowledge. The study of jurisprudence has become the main source of
education of the justice system and contributes to the autonomous field of
the law, in charge of assuring order, peace, and justice through a
specialized linear knowledge that only a jurist admitted to the bar may
understand and interpret “correctly.”
Some jurists have the impression that, by hearing expert testimony, they
have successfully applied the scientific method to legal analysis. They also
have the impression that, by hearing scientific testimony in a proceeding,
legal analysis becomes interdisciplinary. Yet the exposure to the scientific
method and other fields of knowledge through expert testimony in a trial
does not automatically invest the jurist with the skills needed to integrate
such methods and fields of knowledge into legal analysis.
An additional problem with this contention is that the courts use this type
of expert testimony as a tool to explain or demystify scientific theory,
which is very different from what a scientist actually does when applying
math in scientific methodology. This is like the role of a jurist when she
goes to dinner; the fact that she tasted and perhaps enjoyed the dinner does
not automatically convert the jurist into a chef. This distortion of science
in the law is arbitrary; the elements of each cause of action, crime, and rule
28. Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1607).
29. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT viii (2d

ed. 1879) (using certain cases to derive the few fundamental legal principles that exist
in contracts through inductive reasoning); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) (noting that Langdell believed that, through scientific
methods, lawyers could arrive at the correct legal answers from certain integral
principles and concepts).
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of evidence distort and narrow the scientific inquiry to particular experts
and methods. These false appearances and incorrect impressions further
the theory of the law promoted by “insiders,” as the guardian of order,
peace, and justice. This disguises its principal role, which is to maintain
the current distribution of assets, resources, and opportunities.
We can infer from these concepts that, throughout history, the nature of
the system itself did not change, but rather modified its actors. The jurist
put himself into the shoes of the King, embraced with a heavenly science
that only he may understand. Nevertheless, the intelligent tactic of jurists
in substituting the King with similar attributes did not eliminate the
pseudoscientific nature of the justice system. We infer that the justice
system is a disguised form of power, not a system that seeks reliable tools
for assessment of risk and achievement of “substantive security.”30 The
legal system has appropriated the power that the King had held through
divine right (“heavenly science”) and used it to further the interests of the
new holders of power, the traditional elites, and the emerging commercial
classes. In this respect, knowledge has become the slave of the law just as
it had become the slave of religious theology during the Dark Age of Faith,
a period characterized by denial of all scientific reasoning.31 In that period,
anyone who did not behave in accordance to the law of the Catholic Church
was declared a heretic, and executed, which the current justice system does
in a metaphorical sense when somebody does not think or behave in
accordance to the law of the state as configured by “insiders.”32
During the Dark Age of Faith (566-1095), science and thought did not
develop in Europe, and human potential wasted its resources in close
theological quibbles and hermeneutical exercises until the Renaissance.
The bulk of the members of the legal community at the present are in a
similar position to that of scholars of the Dark Age of Faith. Students and
practitioners of the law are exposed to what the “insiders” want us to read,
study, and analyze, through the concept of a limited jurisprudence. Jurists
have become accustomed to see the world through the eyes of “insiders”
due to our legal formation, just as the clergy did in the Dark Ages.
Scholars substituted the Bible for the law and jurisprudence of “insiders.”
Nevertheless, the last stages of the Dark Age of Faith had flashes of hope
personified in the following luminaries: Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527),
30. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 199-213 (2004) (finding that the
institutional mechanisms likely to be used in dealing with catastrophic risks are the
exact same principles that are necessary to integrate science with law).
31. See WILL DURANT, THE AGE OF FAITH 732 (1950) (describing this period as a
time where the Catholic Church placed the word of religious authorities over personal
experience and rational activity).
32. By metaphorical sense I mean the justice system will “kill” outsider’s cause of
action or convict in a criminal case. See infra Part III.C.
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who rebelled against the dictatorship of the clergy; Rene Descartes (15961650), dubbed the “Father of Modern Philosophy” and a major figure in
seventeenth century continental rationalism; Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677),
who laid the groundwork for the eighteenth century Enlightenment and
modern day biblical criticism; and Leibniz, whom we have already
discussed. These scholars sparked the empiricists Thomas Hobbes (15881679), John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), JeanJacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and David Hume (1711-1776).
Today, we can perceive stages of the Dark Age of the Law with flashes
of hope personified by jurists such as Holmes, the precursor of the legal
realism movement;33 Roscoe Pound (1870-1964), father of “sociological
jurisprudence;” and Jerome New Frank (1889-1957). In addition, recent
flashes of hope have been personified by Richard Posner with economics,
Roberto Mangabeira Unger with Critical Legal Studies, J.B Ruhl and
Harold J. Ruhl, Jr. with complexity theory, Douglas Baird and F.E. GuerraPujols with game theory, Laurence H. Tribe, Daniel Martin Katz, and the
author of this paper with math and science.34 This list is illustrative and not
exclusive of other jurists and interdisciplinary trends on the rise.35

33. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 1 (1979)
(critiquing the “insider” methods, rules and procedures inherent to the Supreme Court).
34. The following articles display the mathematical and scientific perspectives that
I have developed. See, e.g., Orlando I. Martínez-García & Mireya Baltazar-Suazo, De
la Educacíon al Colapso de la Justicia [From Education to the Collapse of Justice]
(2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104525;
Orlando I. Martínez-García, The Pseudoscientific Nature of the Justice System and the
Paths Towards Scientific Knowledge Processes that Lead to Universal Justice Patterns
(Oct.
1,
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=1104522; Orlando I. MartínezGarcía, Towards a Justice System with Low entropy and Order Through:
Reconstruction of Norm Construction Persons, Caps, Norm Construction Methods and
Periodical Table of the Juridical Elements (July 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998740. These viewpoints have been tacitly
adopted and further refined, developed and applied by others, in specific the
distinguished cluster from the University of Michigan composed of Michael J.
Bommarito II and Daniel Martin Katz with the collaboration of Jon Zelner. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Bommarito II, et al., Law as a Seamless Web? Comparison of Various
Network Representations of the United States Supreme Court Corpus (1791-2005)
(Oct. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, Proceedings of the 12th Int’l Conf. on
Artificial
Intelligence
and
Law
(ICAIL
2009)),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419525; Michael J. Bommarito II & Daniel M. Katz, A
Mathematical Approach to the Study of the United States Code (Mar. 2010) (preprint
submitted to Elsevier), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578094; Michael J.
Bommarito II & Daniel M. Katz, Properties of the United States Code Citation
Network
(Mar.
23,
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502927.
35. Before the Bible inspired divine authority in a God and before the law inspired
the will of the people, the source of inspiration was nature. In those ancient times
“insiders,” were able to manipulate thought and reasoning by personifying nature in
the mythological gods.
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III. A FRESH START FOR THE LAW: PREDICTIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND
EXPERIMENTS
A. The Path
Holmes very much developed the legal argot of using “The Path” within
legal scholars after his address “The Path of the Law” in which he stated,
“[f]or the rational study of the law the black letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master
of economics.”36 When referring to statistics and economics, he implicates
science; in a subsequent article, he develops the idea of a legal analysis that
finds “answers based on science” while analogizing to the chemical and
biological sciences.37 Why does Holmes refer to science with such
importance?
The respect human kind has for knowledge is one of the most peculiar
characteristics of science. Knowledge in Latin is scientia, and science
became the name of the most honored and respected knowledge.38 Science
has been defined as “a careful, disciplined, and logical investigation of any
aspect of the universe, through the evaluation of the best evidence available
and always subject to correction, improvement as better evidence is
discovered.”39
In the western sciences, Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) is considered to be
the first scientist to use the scientific method, which he employed to
determine that the planet Earth revolves around the Sun. He also
revolutionized the sciences by emphasizing the observation of routine,
everyday phenomena that society had largely taken for granted. Galileo
was revolutionary, because he concentrated his energies in observing things
people from his era had been trained to ignore.40
Jurists of our justice system, through their academic preparation, have
learned to ignore things that we must relearn to observe. We need to learn
36. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 469.
37. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.

REV. 443, 462 (1899) (advocating strongly a melding of science with the law due to
science’s ultimate importance in the world, by finding the relative worth of our social
ends, by its unyielding pursuit of truth, and its constant shifting of perspectives and
viewpoints).
38. See Imre Lakotos, Science and Pseudoscience, in PHILOSOPHY IN THE OPEN 96
(Godfrey Vesey ed., 1974) (outlining his distinctive view that the “demarcation
problem” of distinguishing between science and pseudoscience was a problem of vital
social and political significance and was even comparable to life and death).
39. JOSÉ WUDKA, THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1988).
40. See FRITJOF CAPRA, supra note 9, at 22. Historians differ on exactly when the
modern scientific age began, but certainly by the time Galileo Galilei, Rene Descartes,
and Isaac Newton had their say, it was briskly under way. See also BRIAN GREENE,
THE FABRIC OF THE COSMOS, SPACE, TIME AND THE TEXTURE OF REALITY 7 (2004).
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to have a fresh and uncontaminated look towards the facts presented before
the justice system in our time. The jurist of the Nouveau Régime must
analyze the facts of the present through methods that incorporate the
advancements of the philosophies of math and sciences from our unique
spatial and temporal perspective for a sustainable evolution. The elements
required to move a pseudoscience towards a science are essentially being
able to perform inductive, verifiable, and falsifiable experiments. The first
requirement of being inductive implies reliance on empirical evidence,
experiments, and observation of facts. The second requirement of being
verifiable means that its predictions can be verified. This requirement is
credited to the nineteenth-century movement known as logical positivism
developed by the members of the Circle of Vienna that insisted in the
significance of a proposition being dependent on the method of its
verification. If it cannot be verified, it does not have significance.
However, this verification criteria has evolved and as originally construed
has been in part abandoned as a research programme.41 The third
requirement is to be falsifiable, which means making predictions capable of
being submitted to a methodology that may prove them false.
It is this scientific attitude, this rationality, this intellectual responsibility
toward knowledge, but even more, toward the human beings and the
Cosmos, that should run through our veins toward pushing us to join our
sensibilities and intuition the ways of the modern mathematician and
scientist. Jurists should not give legitimacy to knowledge that presents us
with a minimum of critical and argumentative rationality. We should
procure what is practical and operational, not rely on what is speculative,
inefficient, and fraudulent. In that spirit, I now explore the leading law of
the United States of America within this frame of thought.
B. Inconsistencies with the Geometry of the Constitution: Counting and
Graphing Experiment
While lawyers would do well, to be sure, to learn scientific logic from
the exposition of scientific method, it is far more important that they
catch the spirit of the creative scientist, which yearns not for safety but
risk, not for certainty but adventure, which thrives on experimentation,
invention and novelty and not on the nostalgia for the absolute, which
devotes itself to new ways of manipulating protean particulars and not to
the quest of undeviating universals.42
41. See LOGICAL POSITIVISM (Alfred Jules Ayer ed., 1959); MARTIN DIEGO
FARRELL, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE LOGICAL POSITIVISM (1979); Vienna Circle,
Sept.
18,
2006,
Standford
Encyclopedia
of
Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/.
42. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (6th prtg. 1948), cited in J.B. Crozier,
Legal Realism and a Science of Law, 29 AM. J. JURIS. 151 (1984).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010

17

MARTÍNEZ-GARCÍA 08/15/10

11/11/2010 6:10:00 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 7

520

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 18:3

In the spirit of the creative scientist and empiric descriptive analysis, I
experiment with the Constitution and its leading interpretation in Marbury
v. Madison43 that will illustrate the inconsistencies of the actual legal
Régime. With this illustration, I hope jurists break loose from the domain
of limited analysis based on legal quibbles that promote “insider” status
and look beyond the shadows of Plato’s famous Parable of the Cave.44 It
is important to expand our domains of analysis to see what legal analysis
has trained us not to see.
Math will help us visualize a structure of the original intent of the
Constitution, and how the legal community has frequently distorted that
goal through traditional legal analysis of the autonomous field of the law in
favor of “insider” status. Hence, I analyze the structure of the Constitution
counting its Preamble, Articles, and Amendments. The traditional legal
analysis is epitomized in the interpretation “insider” have given to the
landmark case of Marbury v. Madison in order to keep their status.
In this example, the main tool is the measurement and visualization of
existing phenomena of our justice system in order to detect patterns of
regularity. The patterns of regularity are messages that come in coded form
that can be deciphered using math. The conviction that the underlying
regularity of Nature can be expressed in mathematical terms is at the very
basis of the scientific method and has been historically supported by
persons that made major contributions towards our understanding of the
universe. However, in striving to avoid the pseudoscientific practice of
relying on history or the prestige of certain persons to gain legitimacy, I
refrain from mentioning any. Instead, I expose, based on our common
experience, that it is the existence of physical systems in the natural world
that lend themselves to arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction,
and multiplication, once assigned an abstract number to a collection of
objects that corroborates what has been a constant, that the physical world
is calculable. The example of the Constitution and other examples that
follow regarding the person and use of numbers in legal analysis is an
attempt to extend that constant of calculability to the justice system.
The method of converting words of the law, such as Constitution, into
numbers is performed by counting different types of information
conveniently separated into appropriate categories such as actors
(legislative, executive, or judicial branches) in the actor category or actions
or powers in the actions or powers category, all related to one another,
making counting easier. This conversion also allows us to answer
intriguing questions like, “Which actors (or types of actors) perform given

43. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
44. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (R. E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. Press 2006) (c. 380 B.C.).
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actions?” This data can then be related using any type of Relational
Database Management System (RDBMS) that makes possible the statistical
analysis of what are words, despite the complexity of the structure.
However, that exercise is out of the scope of this work and I highly
recommend the work of my mentor in such matters, Dr. Roberto Franzosi
for an in depth analysis of the force of this method.45 I will now
recapitulate the illustration of the Constitution an original analysis
developed with basic standard software.
The Constitution consists of one preamble, seven articles, and twentyseven amendments. Legal scholarship sometimes subdivides the articles
and amendments into sections, in which some sentences and/or part of the
sentences have numbers within brackets that we classify as sub-sections.
The Constitution has one hundred and forty-four sentences distributed as
follows: Article I has forty-four sentences, Article II has eighteen
sentences, Article III has eight sentences, Article IV has eight sentences,
Article V has one sentence, Article VI has three sentences, Article VII has
one sentence, and the amendments total sixty-five sentences.
In order to graph this data I used Microsoft Word and produced the
following graphic structure of “The Constitution:”
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45. See generally ROBERTO FRANZOSI, FROM WORDS TO NUMBERS: NARRATIVE,
DATA, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (2004); ROBERTO FRANZOSI, QUANTITATIVE NARRATIVE
ANALYSIS (2010). Other applications of content analysis are explored in KLAUS
KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS (1980) and ROBERT PHILIP WEBER, BASIC
CONTENT ANALYSIS, (Michael S. Lewis-Beck ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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From top to bottom, the first level is composed of one circle representing
one sentence of the preamble. The second level is composed of eight
circles representing the headings of the seven articles and one circle for all
twenty-seven amendments. The third level is composed of the headings of
the twenty-one sections of Articles I through V, three sub-sections of
Article VI, and the twenty-seven amendments. The fourth and fifth levels
represent sub-sections and ordinary sentences under each section
represented vertically from left to right; in the first vertical line, every
circle is a sub-section and the linked circles on the right side of the vertical
line appear if a sub-section has more than one sentence. Every circle has a
text box that, due to the dimension and resolution of this graph, is
impossible to read at this time; however, this limitation does not affect its
universal graphic understanding. The graph in the first level has one
sentence from the Preamble and all the other sentences or part of sentences
classified as sub-sections are in the fourth and fifth levels. I now share one
of my first impressions of this structure.
The graph shows us that Article I has the greatest number of sections,
sub-sections, and sentences, and it is given syntactical and structural
primacy and importance by being titled Article I, by being written prior to
the other Articles and by being graphed in the far left side. Our eyes read
first what is at the far left due to our habits and training of reading from left
to right, the powers enumerated under Article I appear as sub-sections
while the other Articles appear without any expressed enumeration, such as
those in Article I, Section 8. How is it then that Article I has become sort
of a technical assistant to Article III? Currently, Congress drafts and
approves laws, but the Court establishes the final meaning of the law?
Using this graph, could the argument be made that Marbury v. Madison
should be revoked pursuant to the graphic structure of the Constitution?
Should the courts declare Marbury v. Madison unconstitutional? Has it
perpetuated patterns of subordination, thanks to the pseudoscientific nature
of the justice system? In other words, is Marbury legitimate simply
because it was decided by an important person (Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall), a long time ago (1803), and the decision has been reiterated
repeatedly in subsequent jurisprudence? Has it shifted the power of the
people to a few (oligarchy between the President and the Supreme Court
Justices), reducing entropy and increasing order while fomenting the
appearance of a strong Congressional body with high entropy? Does the
power shared between the President and the Supreme Court Justices lend
itself for telephone justice—in other words, a telephone call from the
President to the Chief Justice or vice versa to decide the proper meaning of
the law and how to execute it?
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As we have seen in this example by merely counting, we have been able
to find connections and patterns that otherwise are difficult to grasp. This
illustration of inconsistency between structure of the law and subsequent
interpretations has given a perspective on the nature of the problem and the
need for auditing these repetitive patterns of control and subordination. We
can now focus on the subject of the law as defined under the concept of the
person in the hope that with this micro perspective on the person, I can
plant a seed in legal scholarship for further scientific development of legal
analysis.
C. The Person in the Law: Achilles’ Heel
In order to focus and experiment further with the nature of the problem
with the justice system vis-à-vis “insider” “outsider” dynamics, we now
explore the concept of the person. I will illustrate the person through the
statutory and jurisprudential treatment in Puerto Rico, a jurisdiction in
which I have practiced law for the last fifteen years.
The Puerto Rico justice system constructs the concept of the person
differently in the civil and criminal fields of law. The Puerto Rico Civil
Code has two general modalities of the person: natural and artificial, as
defined in Articles twenty-four and twenty-seven of the Puerto Rico Civil
Code, stating, “[b]irth determines civil personality and capacity. A child
shall be considered as born when completely separated from his mother’s
womb.”46 On the other hand, the code defines the artificial person as
follows:
The following are artificial persons:
[a] Corporations and associations of public interest, having artificial
personality recognized by law. The personality of such bodies shall
commence from the moment of their establishment in accordance with
law.
[b] Private corporations, companies or associations, whether civil,
commercial or industrial, to which the law grants legal personality.47

As these statutory definitions demonstrate, a person in the justice system
is a human being or a corporation, company, or association of public or
private interest recognized by law. Plaintiffs often base personal injury and
other civil rights litigation lawsuits against officials and governments on
these statutes that are incorporated by the courts through the Constitution.
In some cases, the Legislature has partially taken over some areas of tort
law and passed statutes that supplant or modify the definition of the person.
For example, in product liability cases in which there is absolute vicarious
46. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 81 (2009) (corresponding to the Civil Code of 1930,
§ 24).
47. Id. § 101 (corresponding to the Civil Code of 1930, § 27).
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liability, the person liable for a defective product includes manufacturers,
distributors, and retail sellers.
Likewise, the Puerto Rico Penal Code defines persons as “[p]rincipals
and accessories are criminally liable.”48 Principal and authors are then
defined in Section 3172 as follows:
Principals or authors shall be:
[a] Whoever takes direct part in the commission of an offense.
[b] Whoever forces, provokes, abets, induces or aids another to commit
an offense.
[c] Whoever avails himself of a nonliable person to commit the offense.
[d] Whoever, subsequent to the commission of an offense, helps those
who took direct part in the commission of the offense in compliance with
a promise prior to said commission.
[e] Whoever cooperates, in any other way, in the commission of the
offense.49

The code then expands the definition of person to include other
categories under the term accessories. The code states, “Accessories are
deemed to be those who in order to evade the action of justice, knowing of
the offense, without having taken part as authors, conceal the offender or
procure the disappearance, alteration, or concealment of evidence.”50
Finally, we have “juridical persons,” 51 who are defined in the Penal Code
as:
Juridical persons legally constituted in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico or authorized to act as such and not unincorporated shall be a
criminally liable association where through persons authorized to carry
out their agreements and on their behalf, or upon performing acts
attributable to them, commit criminal acts.
This liability does not exclude individual liability attached to the
components, directors or representatives of the juridical persons or of the
unincorporated associations which take part in the criminal act.52

The Puerto Rico criminal system, similar to the majority of jurisdictions
worldwide, establishes a nominal distinction between criminal and civil
law that substantially affects the role of the object (general or particular
48. Id. at tit. 33, § 3171 (corresponding to various provisions of the Penal Code of
1974) (repealed 2004).
49. Id. § 3172 (corresponding to various provisions of the Penal Code of 1974)
(repealed 2004).
50. Id. § 3173 (corresponding to various provisions of the Penal Code of 1974)
(repealed 2004).
51. The official translation of the term “personas jurídicas” in the Puerto Rico Civil
Code is “artificial persons,” while in the Puerto Rico Penal Code the same term has
been translated using the word “juridical” instead of “artificial,” I have not found any
reason for such subtle variance.
52. tit. 33, § 3174 (corresponds to various provisions of the Penal Code of 1974)
(repealed 2004).
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victim) through its definitions of the person. By definition, crimes involve
wrongs against the state, and the person who brings the action is a public
prosecutor rather than a private individual. This distinction is crucial, since
the state may not only impose monetary penalties on criminal offenders—
analogous to awards of civil damages in tort cases—but may also imprison
those found guilty of crimes. Of course, the victim of a crime will often be
the central actor in a criminal prosecution, both as a witness and as a party
in a separate tort action seeking personal compensation for the injuries
inflicted by the crime.
Yet, the concept of crime is conceptually distinct from that of tort,
because in criminal proceedings the state brings the action to vindicate the
interests of society. If the definition of the person is ambiguous and
general, it will have malleable overbroad implications. “Insiders” will have
at their disposal the overbroad concept of the person as a key to the vault of
state resources to decide through its agents in the justice system when to
prosecute or acquiesce in order to preserve “insider” hegemony. Hence,
the prevailing legal regime as used by “insiders” through the broad and
ambiguous conception of the person is often a diplomatic way of disguising
the exercise of force and oppression against “outsiders.” We now consider
how the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has interpreted these statutes.
Regarding the person as defined in the Civil and Penal codes, the
opinions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico have consistently expanded
or restricted their coverage to all types of behavior reflecting arbitrary
constructions that promote “insider” status. The court’s opinions on civil
matters have consistently expressed that the person in the juridical sense
means every being or entity capable of rights and obligations.53 An
“Artificial Person” is, consequently, the collection of persons or goods that
organized for purposes of realizing a permanent goal, obtain recognition by
the State as a subject of law.54 The court held in Laureano Pérez v. Soto
that in order for a person to be responsible in an action for damages, it is
necessary that that person has acted with free will and capacity.55 The
opinions in criminal matters pertaining to the person illustrate how courts
using tools of hermeneutics include or exclude persons from prosecution or
liability through the law and “legitimize” prevailing practices that prolong
exclusion of “outsiders.” In that trend, a potpourri of Puerto Rico Supreme
Court opinions has established the following precedents.

53. Rivera Maldonado v. Commonwealth, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 88, 95 (1987).
54. Rivera Maldonado v. E.L.A., 119 D.P.R. 74 (1987) (citing DIEGO ESPÍN

CÁNOVAS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL ESPAÑOL 370 (6th ed. 1977), available at
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL5264920M/Manual_de_derecho_civil_espan%CC%83
ol).
55. Laureano Pérez v. Soto, 141 P.R. Dec. 77, 89 (1996).
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Mere presence of a person during the commission of a crime is not
sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain a conviction for that crime, but the
Court has extended this definition in Pueblo v. Pagan Santiago by stating
that presence may be considered together with other circumstances that
surround the event for purposes of determining criminal liability.56 This
construction has been expanded to the domain of facts to be considered by
expanding the time dimension to events before and after the wrongful
events. The court made such time expansions by stating in Pueblo ex rel.
F.S.C. that in cases of co-authorship, criminal liability should be
established by prior and subsequent acts, and which considered together
reveal existence of conspiracy or common design.57 This expansive
construction increases the domain of events to be considered to those prior
and subsequent, events that under such a construction may be infinite. This
is problematic because such a definition has no objective, verifiable or
falsifiable limit as to which prior or subsequent facts to consider.
Puerto Rico precedents also extend the evidence that may support a
conviction on indirect evidence. The court held in Pueblo v. Ortiz
Martínez that to establish a principal’s criminal liability based upon
common design, indirect or circumstantial evidence suffices to establish
concert or agreement.58 Indirect and circumstantial evidence opens the
gates for agents of the state to justify any determination based on any fact,
since in a system, everything is part of a whole and as such, it is
interdependent.59 As such, “insiders,” through agents of the justice system,
may conveniently highlight any fact and give it more credibility and weight
than other facts in order to justify excluding “outsiders.”
Where mere presence has been found, extensions of the concept have
been developed to impose criminal liability. Where a principal’s liability
could be established from prior actions or as the result of conspiracy or
common design, mere passive presence thereof during a criminal
transaction sufficed to hold him liable and personal, active participation
was not required.60 Notwithstanding the fact that mere presence of person
in the scene of a crime would not suffice to sustain a conviction, such
56. Pueblo v. Pagan Santiago, 130 P.R. Dec. 470, 478 (1992).
57. Pueblo ex rel. F.S.C., 128 P.R. Dec. 931, 938-39 (1991).
58. Pueblo v. Ortiz Martínez, 116 D.P.R. P.R. Offic. Trans. 139174 , 116 P.R. Dec.

139, 145 (1985)
59. Cf. TRINH XUAN THUAN, CHAOS AND HARMONY, PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 216-17, 225 (2006) (“The world is no
longer simply a huge collection of inert and isolated particles subject to mechanistic
and deterministic laws, the way Newton and Laplace had imagined. Quantum
mechanics tells us that localized reality has no meaning and that these particles are part
of a whole. The universe is unified into a vast network of connections and
interactions.”).
60. Ortiz Martínez, 116 P.R. Dec. at 145.
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presence together with other circumstances surrounding criminal
transaction could be taken into consideration to hold the person liable under
Furthermore, intentional conduct
principles of co-principalship.61
traditionally considered malum in se is not required; an omission
traditionally left to the civil arena or a tort action may also be included as
criminal conduct.62 Precise definitions of sufficient surrounding criminal
circumstances are ill defined or limited; it will depend on what “insiders”
in the justice system select, give weight to, and interpret.
Precedents have also established that even when the person is neither at
the scene of the crime nor has a mere passive presence, she can still be held
criminally liable if the system determines that she had an agreement or
motivated the chain of events, a finding that depends on the discretion of
credibility determinations by “insiders’” agents in the justice system. The
court has found that where two or more concerted people in agreement
motivate the possession and carrying of an illegal firearm, the fact that only
one defendant actually illegally possessed and carried the weapon does not
exonerate the other(s).63 The initiator of a criminal action should be liable
for its ultimate consequences.64 A person who keeps a runaway car motor
running to facilitate escape after robbery has been correctly deemed a
principal or author.65 Furthermore, a principal or author of a robbery
resulting in two murders cannot claim exclusion of criminal liability
thereof because a group of citizens had arrested her before those murders
occurred.66 From these precedents we can infer that where “insiders” target
and isolate an “outsider” through arrest the courts can still hold her liable
for conduct performed by others, even when she is under their control
unable to make any command or take any action in favor or against events
out of her reach.
In civil actions, a tort is defined primarily as an event, arising out of the
61. Id.
62. See Paul Rosenzweig, HERITAGE FOUND., Executive Summary: The Over-

Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, 1-2 (Apr. 17, 2003),
http//www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2003/04/im7-Executive-Summary-The-OverCriminalization-of-Social-and-Economic-Conduct (discussing how legislatures have
expanded criminalized conduct in pursuit of public goods instead of primarily focusing
on acts thought to be intrinsically wrong).
63. See Ortiz Martínez, 116 P.R. Dec. at 149 (“The possession and transportation
of a weapon could be imputed to another accused when facts that constitute elements of
the crime are present and the accused that did not possess or transport the weapon takes
a direct or indirect part in the commission of the crime”) .
64. People v. Calderon Laureano, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans. 742 (1982) (“Anybody that
initiates a criminal act should respond for the consequences that her act create.)
65. People v. Lucret Quinones, 11 P.R. Offic. Trans. 904 (1981) (“There isn’t the
slightest doubt that the person that remains in a motor vehicle while a robbery is
conducted, with the motor vehicle running so that the others escape immediately, is an
author of the crime.”).
66. Id.
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action or omission of another party and causing injury to the human body
or mind, to property, or to an economic interest, in circumstances where the
law deems it just to require compensation from the person who has acted or
failed to act. Puerto Rico bases civil tort liability on Article 1802, which
consists of two sentences that state, “[a] person who by act or omission
causes damages to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done. Concurrent imprudence of the party aggrieved
does not except from liability, but entails a reduction of the indemnity.”67
Upon this disposition, Puerto Rico courts have found enough flexibility to
expand its coverage to all forms of conflict avoiding scrutiny from audits or
independent established scientific methodology to corroborate their
analysis.
Under these broad guidelines, can an “outsider” escape prosecution and
conviction if targeted for approximating too much to “insiders’” circle of
power? Yes, during my fifteen years of practice as a trial attorney in the
state and federal courts I have used my office as a laboratory in which
every case is a new experiment in which I view the process with an open
perspective not limited to facts and procedures within the parameters of
traditional legal analysis (law, rules, and jurisprudence). I integrate
knowledge of different fields while observing and studying the justice
system dynamic. As a result, I have corroborated through various cases the
critique of LatCrit scholars that when the defendant is an “insider” and the
stakes are high, judges maneuver with procedural and substantive
discretion against the “outside” party. However, when the defendant is an
“outsider” and the stakes are also high, procedural and substantive laws are
applied according to their regular meaning and practice against them.
Following the call of LatCrit scholar, Francisco Valdes, to “perform the
theory”,68 and in the spirit of the scientific method, the following are
examples of some of the federal cases in the United States District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico in which I have participated and observed
various modes and maneuvers of “insiders” in distorting the law to further
their own interests. These case samples are a bank of data for further legal
and empirical analysis:
a. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Garcia, the court protected the
“insiders,” striking motions from the record in order to generate a “chilling
effect” that encouraged “the outsiders” my clients to abandon the case;69
67. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5141 (amended in 1956, Law 28).
68. Francisco Valdes, Barely at the Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal

Education-A Curricular Study with Lat Critical Commentary, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA
L.J. 119 (2002).
69. 3:01-CV-01-1239 (D.P.R. Jan. 20, 2005) (the “insiders” were the United States
Postal Office and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company); see also Garcia-Sanchez v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:02-CV-02591 (D.P.R. Oct. 26, 2004) (similar pattern to the
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b. Alfonso-Reyes v. United States, the plaintiff, a federal employee,
was the “outsider”, and the United States government was the insider.
Plaintiff, Ismael was a federal employee with nationalistic perspectives and
as such, an “outsider”, he was also active in signaling irregularities of
“insiders” and as a result was subjected to retaliation. The system failed to
address his complaints and the machinery of the justice system was
activated against him for encroaching upon “insiders’” circle. As a result,
he ended being convicted and deprived of all his wealth;70
c. C.J.P.I. v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,71 a father was shot to death
with an illegally introduced firearm into the working premises by a
management-level employee who used to sell weapons to subordinates and
other co-employees. In this case, the Court dismissed with prejudice the
complaint of plaintiff, the vitctim’s minor child, due to six months of
inactivity, despite the fact that the minor did not have legal representation
and his mother had a conflict of interest because she continued to work for
the defendant, Pfizer;
d. Mendez Internet Management Services, Inc. v. The Bankers
Association of Puerto Rico,72 the Court’s use of discretion in procedural
matters has unreasonably favored the “insiders’,” banks and the Bankers
Association;
e. At the state local level, Club Cala de Palmas del Mar Property
Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Club Cala de Palmas Properties Inc.,73 where the
Superior Court of First Instance of Humacao, Puerto Rico abused discretion
in procedural interpretation depriving plaintiffs of discovery, and evaded
issuing opinions supported with facts and law. The allegations of plaintiffs
were also ignored by the existence of gross inaction by the state agencies
(Department of Tourism and Department of Consumer Affairs “DACO”)
and the Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, inaction that protected
the interests of “insiders’,” in this case, local developers against
“outsiders”, the timeshare owners.
These ambiguities and internal inconsistencies support the need for a
new approach under a Nouveau Régime. The approaches discussed in the
next parts will propose concrete methods to measure and audit these
previous case was followed)
70. No. 3:04-CV-01220 (D.P.R. Apr. 21, 2005), see also United States v. AlfonsoReyes, No. 3:03-CR-00124-02 (D.P.R. Jan. 19, 2010). Likewise, in United States v.
Toledo-Fernandez, the plaintiff “outsider” got too close to the “insiders’” circle. No.
3:03-CR-00124 (D.P.R. Jan. 19, 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Alfonzo-Reyes,
593 F.3d 280 (1st Cir. 2010).
71. 04-2236(JAF).
72. No. 3:09-CV-01667; 09-1667(FAB).
73. Civil No. HSCI2006-112 (208), 2007 WL 2345143, at *6-8 (P.R. Cir. June 29,
2008).
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patterns, and offer suggestions for improvement in addressing this
phenomenon.
IV. THE BUILDING BLOCKS: NUMBERS, EXPERIMENTS, AND CAUSATION
A. Numbers
Numbers in their most general form are simply a set of things with order,
structure, and properties. Solving issues of fact and law involves making
connections between what is known and what is unknown. Knowing
requires understanding, and understanding requires connecting what is
already known. Numbers are a tool that allows us to analyze the
connections between things. For example, in mathematical notation, I can
express the quality of ambiguities and internal inconsistencies that statutory
construction and interpretation produce in our actual Régime. I do this by
first defining the infinite meanings in every word of the law with a halfopen interval, [w, ∞).74 This same notation can then be expressed as the
inequality w ≤ ∞. An inequality is a statement that two quantities or
expressions are not equal.75 I can then sketch the inequalities in a graph as
follows:
————[ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >
w
∞
Hence, the words of the law in legal analysis, as shown through previous
jurisprudence and this mathematical depiction, will have as many meanings
as the jurist conducting legal analysis finds fit, a trend historically used by
“insiders” that are occupying key adjudicatory positions of the system.
Contrary to the two broad conceptions of natural and artificial persons in
the justice system, the symbolic nature of numbers has allowed them to
enjoy a rich history of success in scientific developments, not necessarily
focused on the exercise of power in perpetuating the hegemony of
“insiders”, but rather focused on universal understanding and human
achievement applicable to all, “insiders” and “outsiders.” Hence, thinkers
from a wide variety of cultures have made great discoveries in the fields of
math and science through the discovery that numbers can be powerful tools
of other methodologies in those fields. Likewise, I suggest correlating the
concept of the person by numbers in order to import the different
methodologies developed in math and science. Using numbers allows legal
74. Where “w” means word, “∞” is a notational device representing infinity and is
not a real number, “[ “ means a closed interval (that in this case begins with “w”), and
the “ )” means an open interval that extends to the infinite “∞,” in terms of the many
possible interpretations of each word “w.”
75. It may be the case that one quantity is less than (<), less than or equal to (≤),
greater than (>), or greater than or equal to (≥) another quantity or expression.
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scholars to perform a more rigorous analysis, and will open the gates to
auditing the methodologies that are used by “insiders.” Audits help
develop consensus by the people under a Nouveau Régime.
The concept of a number is not a fixed, rigid idea, as many perceive it to
be, but an ever-evolving notion, just as the RUI parameters establish. As
our understanding of the world expands and our capacity for abstract
thinking grows, so too does our view of what a number means. In math,
the development of algebraic symbolism grew in various stages: the
rhetorical or early stage, in which everything is written out fully in words;
the syncopated or intermediate stage, in which some abbreviations are
adopted; and the symbolic or final stage. Such an arbitrary division of the
development of algebra into three stages is, of course, a facile
oversimplification; but it can serve effectively as a first approximation to
what has happened.76 The law is still in that primitive phase of words and
sounds, while algebra and mathematics generally epitomize the third stage
of symbolic expression.
The statutory definition of a person in the Puerto Rican justice system
(and the jurisprudence previously presented) evade audits through the
absence of any reliable methodology, providing an example of the law’s
pseudoscientific nature in a primitive rhetorical stage. This primitive stage
preserves cliques and clusters of “insiders” and unreasonable degrees of
inequality and inefficiency in society. In contrast, the use of numbers, as in
arithmetic, can open the gates of legal analysis to rigorous analytical
methodologies, such as functions to describe relationships, models to
predict what will happen or review what happened, and systems of
equations (linear, quadratic, polynomial, rational, exponential, and
logarithmic) to find balance and equitable results based on available data
instead of a system that evades audits in order to justify any convenient
position.
Many jurists incorrectly believe that mathematicians understand and
know all of mathematics; in fact, most of mathematics remains mysterious.
The law, similar to mathematics, has been motivated by necessity, but in
different dimensions; law has been used by “insiders” under reigning
hegemonies to maintain power, while math has been used by physical and
theoretical scientists and scholars to enhance universal understanding that
has permitted significant theoretical and applied innovations.
Moreover, ordinary citizens by necessity have historically had a major
role in the evolution of numbers that antedates writing, literacy, or even
numerical symbols. For example, ancient cultures performed calculations
on sand tables. Merchants and government officials placed pebbles and
76. CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 180 (2d. ed. 1991).
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other markers in columns representing different numbers and then moved
them to depict addition or subtraction.77 A possible origin for the zero
symbol might be the round dimple left in the sand when a pebble was
removed, leaving an empty column.78 Another example was when
shepherds tended flocks and had to keep track of their sheep. As primitive
(agricultural) societies developed, people needed to measure and divide
land, keep track of livestock, record harvests, and take census data. With
growing populations and clashing cultures, a modern economy arose with
many areas of conflict, requiring armies—which in turn required these new
leaders to confront the logistics of arming and feeding their soldiers.79
Hence, a modern economy needed to measure transactions in order to find
equitable distributions and solve conflict.
Similarly, the law out of necessity also developed from a primitive state
to a complex one. In the civil law of modern western civilization, as
European nations transformed from primitive into complex states, they
discovered the Justinian Code, Corpus Juris Civiles, during the thirteenth
century in Bolonia, Italy, as a key source of guidance for governing
institutions in keeping order and hegemony.80 Nevertheless, the study of
the law evolved in such a way as to exclude mathematical notions of the
person through the number. Though the reasons for this evolution are
beyond the scope of this work, I suspect the exclusion of the number in the
present legal system is a product of the “insiders’” sense of selfpreservation, as the current system evades rigorous forms of auditing and
simultaneously permits the exercise of power against anybody under any
pretext.
However, it is worth clarifying that during the last century mathematical
trends in the law have existed, and, while they have not gained prominence,
they have exerted influence over the process. Some scholars have reacted
negatively to this development. For instance, Laurence H. Tribe has
criticized “the growing and bewildering literature of praise for mathematics
in the trial process.”81 Tribe focused his critique on the actual conduct of
civil and criminal trials and accordingly, in designing procedures for the
trial system as a whole. Nevertheless, Tribe focused on the likelihood and
77. See EDWARD B. BURGER, ZERO TO INFINITY: A HISTORY OF NUMBERS, THE
TEACHING COMPANY COURSE GUIDEBOOK 11-20 (2007); MORRIS KLINE,
MATHEMATICS FOR THE NONMATHEMATICIAN 58-75 (Dover 1985) (1967).
78. See BURGER, supra note 77 at 15, 17.
79. See id. (detailing the origins of numbers and their use throughout history).
80. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSEL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM 3-15 (2d ed. 1977) (detailing the background of law of property, tort,
contract, and unjust enrichment).
81. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1971).
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proofs of facts using probability theory, and did not contemplate or exclude
using math to audit either existing legal analysis or using basic elements of
math (such as numbers) to substitute for the vague legal construction of the
person, as is proposed here.
Returning to the nature of numbers and words, when used as the justice
system does through its capacity of infinite interpretations, develops
complexity and uncertainty that distorts our capacity for analysis and
understanding. Human beings have an innate number sense that allows us
to compare instantly small collections of objects, but the more complex the
collection of events, the more difficult it is to grasp by looking. A wellknown example is the barred gate system of representing numbers ( I I I I ).
Numbers arose out of utility; thus, some naming conventions are limited.
Primitive cultures may function very well with words for one, two, three,
and many, but after that, most generalized by pointing to their hair,
implying that, beyond four, things were as countless as the hairs on one’s
head.82 This characteristic of the human capacity to perceive and
understand is exactly what empires have exploited by keeping the state of
complexity that exists in the law high, with ambiguous concepts that evade
auditing, such as the prevailing conception of the person.
The concept of number today includes different categories that
mathematicians have rigorously proven to exist through methods and peer
review, and with a proven record of technological achievements resulting
from their use. In sum, we have the realm of real and imaginary numbers,
of which mathematicians have developed complex-transcendental numbers,
as follows:83

82. See BURGER, supra note 77, at 12.
83. The Ultimate Guide to Number

Classification, Lazymaths.com,
http://www.lazymaths.com/zlog/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/number-classification.pdf
(last visited May 21, 2010).
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84

I reiterate that the discovery of numbers, contrary to the ambiguous
concept of the person, has made it possible to achieve a better
understanding of natural phenomena, thus opening the gates for universal
harmony. An example of this progress through numbers has been the
discovery of the prime, Fibonacci, Euler (e) and Pi (π) numbers.
The number π is used to calculate the area of the circle and it appears in
countless important formulas and theories, including the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle and Einstein’s field equations from his theory of
general relativity.
In addition, the number e, has a value of approximately 2.71, and is
fundamental in our understanding of growth and decay, more commonly
referred to as “exponential growth” and “exponential decay.” The number
e is used frequently in areas such as calculating population growth and
radioactive substance (half-life) decay. The prime, Fibonacci, π and e
numbers are important numbers in the study of calculus and physics.
However, legal study and analysis have failed to exploit them, despite their
success in economics and scientific fields of study. In fact, π helped
number theorists advance the field of numbers by leading to the discovery
of complex and transcendental numbers.85 Nevertheless, the discussion of
the special characteristics of these numbers is beyond the scope of this
84. Id. at Fig. 3.
85. RICHARD COURANT & HERBERT ROBBIN, REVISED BY IAN STEWART, WHAT IS

MATHEMATICS (2d. ed. 1996) (1941) (describing prime numbers at pages 21-30,
complex numbers at pages 88-97 and transcendental numbers at pages 103-107);
BURGER, supra note 77, at 69; see also JOSEPH MAZUR, EUCLID IN THE RAINFOREST,
DISCOVERING UNIVERSAL TRUTH IN LOGIC AND MATH 172 (2005).
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paper. Thus, I will now present some examples of how some may be used
in legal analysis.
B. The Legal Alchemist: Playing with Numbers and the Law: Whole
Integers Experiment and Even and Odd Integers Experiment
The use of numbers as a theoretical foundation for further application to
the subjects and objects of social dynamics should enhance the efficiency
of auditing the exercise of power by insider hegemonies in society. It
would be no surprise to find persons or the infinite set of social behavior
identified with properties found in numbers, such as integers, prime
numbers, e, π, and the Fibonacci sequence.
These elements of numbers are essential for the discovery of natural
sociological patterns and the nature of conflicts that have long been
ignored. Numerical structure, beauty, and pattern existed long before
humankind discovered numbers, but they ably show the path toward
acknowledging that which is most familiar to us, when described
mathematically, often appears exotic. Mathematical analysis shows that
numbers that first appear as exotic are more the norm, and that numbers
that first appear to be the norm are, in actuality, exotic. Jurist may find
something similar in our body of law, once legal analysis is audited using
numbers? I now proceed with three examples, which I hope trigger further
reflection on the many ways a jurist might utilize numbers in legal analysis
to further the goal of auditing “insiders.”
Example 1: Whole Integers
In seventh century India, negative numbers were used to represent debt,
and so it then became necessary to clearly distinguish positive numbers
from negative numbers, or to emphasize what is positive as opposed to
what is negative.86 In legal analysis, we could improve distinctions
between actions and omissions that cause harm with the use of negative
integers, a bright-line distinction that the concept of the person does not
rigorously attend.
Similarly, when somebody dies of natural causes, the absence could be
related to a zero that is not attributable to any action equivalent to a
positive-natural number, or an omission to act, such as a negative number.
The use of zero, a neutral number, when an action is neither the product of
an action or omission that causes a harm, would be a more precise
depiction of the natural neutral state that death of a subject generates.
Similar to the space left when a sand pebble was removed from the sand
tables used for calculations, when somebody dies, a space is also left. In
86. See KLINE, supra note 77, at 72.
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math, this space left by the pebble may have led to the broader use of
place-based number systems and the development of our modern decimal
system, with its powerful positional numeral system. Legal studies have
failed to exploit the number zero as used in mathematics and other
categories such as rational numbers (fractions) when handling concurrent
causes of actions or comparative negligence, omissions that have
potentially debilitated legal analysis in furtherance of “insiders.”
Example 2: Even and Odd Integers
A strategy used to decipher any type of phenomena through “divide and
conquer” is creating one-to-one relationships of social phenomena with
numbers and then breaking them into two classes, even and odd. An even
number is a whole number that is twice another whole number, while an
odd number is not divisible by two.87 These are two characteristics of all
natural numbers; they can be divided into the set of numbers that has no
remainder after dividing by two, and the set of numbers that have a
remainder of one after dividing by two. On the surface, this doesn’t seem
any more useful an idea than simply saying the set of natural numbers is
the union of the set of even numbers and the set of odd numbers. However,
the ramifications are extraordinary: it reduces an infinite collection of
things to a finite collection.88
In addition, numbers are sets of things with order, structure, and
quantifiable properties. Numbers’ structure emanates from the operations
of arithmetic that can be performed among and between them. In the quest
for structures of phenomena, such as our previous example with the visual
construction of the Constitution addition is an indispensable tool that gives
us a unique integer for every pair of integers added together. We can
classify this pair of integers as well as the unique product of their sums as
even or odd.
In similar fashion to the infinite set of integers, we can apply numbers to
other problems in law and social dynamics regarding the treatment of such
fundamental aspects as the passive or active behavior of a person or the
nature of private or common/public property, just like we have just
described with even and odd numbers. The pattern that arises out of these
arithmetical applications consists of the following three modalities:
87. THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS 151, 303 (David Nelson ed., 3d
ed. 2003).
88. “Mathematicians call this the group ‘Zee-mod-two,’ and denote it as Z/2. The
letter Z denotes the integers; the 2 denotes the modulus-all numbers divisible by 2 are
equivalent, and all integers having remainder of 1 after division by 2 are equivalent.”
MAZUR, supra note 85, at 105. In other words, this becomes a binary classification of a
first group of equivalent integers under 0 and the second group of equivalent integers
under 1.
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1. The sum of any two even integers gives us an even integer.
EVEN + EVEN = EVEN
2. The sum of two odd integers gives us an even integer.
ODD + ODD = EVEN
3. The sum of odd and even integers gives us odd integers.
ODD + EVEN = ODD

If we apply this scheme of unique products of addition of even and odd
numbers to a person’s behavior and social dynamics, we may predict the
patterns of her effects. To illustrate, let us classify with the even number
zero (0) any active or passive behavior of persons that promote common
public property in the system and classify with the odd number one (1)
active or passive behavior of persons that promote private property in the
system. Wherever zero (0) is we also include “common” and wherever we
have a one (1) we also include “private” for the nature of property as a
result of the interaction of persons classified as even and odd, depending on
the structure and behavioral characteristics of the persons and property.
We can now apply the arithmetical modalities of even and odd numbers in
a matrix format as follows:

+
Common
0
Private
1

Common
0
Common
0
Private
1

Private
1
Private
1
Common
0

No matter how we label the two categories, be it with integers of even
and odd numbers, or with colors such as black and white, or as here with
types of properties, the addition would have the same results. This
arithmetic inherits many of the structural properties of integers, such as the
cancellation law, x + y = x + z, implying that y = z when x, y, and z are
integers. Therefore, you may have any other set of categories of members
that have these additive structural properties, and it will have the same
result as the above matrix. The only difference would be the names; hence,
the implications of this methodology using numbers for persons would
constitute a substantial leap in standard legal analysis. As the German
physicist Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) expressed: “We cannot help but think
that mathematical formulas have a life of their own, that they know more
than their discoverers do, and that they return more to us than we have
invested in them.”89
89. THUAN, supra note 59, at 314.
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This method of reducing an infinite collection of issues of fact and law,
such as [w,∞) into a finite collection of issues of fact and law [w] helps
members of the justice system make connections between two sets of issues
of fact and law, such as the particular issues of a particular case and
controversy and the answer choices the system must make. This technique
helps find equivalency for purposes of the competing issues under
consideration and the outcome of their relations. This then is an
alternative, elegant way of solving issues; such as, the nature of a given
property based on its characteristics. In the illustration of private + private
= common, we see what at first glance might be counterintuitive, that an
issue between two persons and/or collections of interest regarding the
private nature of property results in property of a common nature. Is this
really contradictory? What are its implications?
The fact that two persons or collection of persons share the same interest,
customs and beliefs would result in a social interaction that is common to
either persons or collections. Only in the presence of competing different
interests is the seed of private interest prevailing over common. For
example, in an election 50% of voters are in favor of one candidate that
represents certain interest, customs and beliefs and the other 50% of the
voters favor the opposing candidate, things would stay balanced, static or
common in this type of election. However, in the presence of an odd
election in which 51% of the voters are in favor of one candidate and 49%
in favor of the other would there be a person or collection of persons
prevailing over the other and thus an unbalanced, dynamical and thus
private type of election. The same pattern would follow in any
adjudication the justice system performs. This matrix graph is then an
elegant way of approaching some of the most important existing debates of
legal analysis regarding the nature of property.90
In order to apply this methodology to the issues regarding the nature and
behavior of persons such as the dynamics of “insiders” and “outsiders” and
their effects, we would need to identify the even and odd structural
characteristics and the threshold levels of each type of person or group.
Once we make this classification and/or coding, we can review the results
by reiterating this application, in order to uncover patterns of norms for the
Nouveau Régime.91
90. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31-91 (6th ed. 2003).
91. I have been tinkering with the nature of even and odd numbers and their

correlation with symmetric and asymmetric, stable and unstable, static and dynamic
phenomena. The present proposal may very well hold the key for the independent
components of legal analysis as a new paradigm based on static, comparative static and
dynamics as suggested by Peter Ziegler in A General Theory of Law as a Paradigm for
Legal Research, 51 MOD. L. REV. 569, 589-92 (1988). I have personally approached
the patterns from the perspective of Chaos-Complexity theory, which is the underlying
structure upon which other scholars have developed their theories. The product of such
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C. Numbers and Causation Using Functions
Functions are an excellent way of analyzing the dependence between
two things: the cause and the effect of an event. In imposing criminal or
civil liability, the use of functions (as developed in math) would
substantially enhance the determination of causation. In a function, a direct
relationship exists between two things in which one action, omission, or
numerical value in some way depends on the action, omission or numerical
value of the other. The action, omission, or thing that depends on the other
value is called the dependent variable; the other value is the independent
variable. The independent variable is called the input variable and in a
graph it is represented with the x-axis also known as abscissa. The
dependent variable is called the output or answer and in a graph it is
represented with the y-axis also known as ordinate.
In math, a function is a direct relation between a given set of elements
(the domain) and another set of elements (the co-domain), which associates
each element in the domain with exactly one element in the co-domain.
The elements so related can be any kind of things (words, objects,
qualities) but are typically mathematical quantities, such as real numbers.
In a setting where outputs of functions are numbers, functions may be
added and multiplied, yielding new functions.
There are many ways to represent or visualize functions: a function may
be described by a formula, by a plot or graph, by an algorithm that
computes it, by arrows between objects, or by a description of its
properties. Sometimes, a function is described through its relationship to
other functions (for example, inverse functions). In applied disciplines,
functions are frequently specified by tables of values or by formulae.
The symbol for the input to a function is often called the independent
variable or argument and is often represented by the letter x or, if the input
is a particular time, by the letter t. The symbol for the output is called the
dependent variable or value and is often represented by the letter y. The
function itself is most often called f, and thus the notation y = f(x) indicates
that a function named f has an input named x and an output named y and/or
f(x) as the following illustration of a function machine shows:

tinkering will be the subject of a separate paper.
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The exact nature of a function, as contrasted to a general relation (also
referred to as an association) would help guide courts in distinguishing acts
or omissions that are only relations that should not hold a person liable
versus a function that would have the more rigorous requirements needed
to impose liability due to a person’s direct relation to the wrong caused.
The following tables distinguish the types of relations needed for a function
versus that of a mere relation.
Function
input (domain)

output (range)

represented by x

represented by y or f(x)

-1

1

0

2

1

3

General Relation (Not a Function)
input (domain)

output (range)

-1

1

0

2

1

3

In the function every input causes an exact output while in a relation an
input causes more than one output. Hence in a function the causation
relation with the output is direct and exclusive while in the relation is not.
Because of this utility of functions they are widely used in the sciences.
Nevertheless, I have frequently wondered why functions being so critical
for calculus and one of the most fundamental ideas in all of mathematics
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with a proven record of success, why have they not become standard in
legal analysis? Is there a reason for this exclusion that is related with
keeping “outsiders” out through a flexible, arbitrary system of analysis?
In any case, I propose that once the word of the law and the words of
recollection of facts are symbolized with numbers, mathematical methods
such as: arithmetic functions of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
exponentiation (+, -, x, and ÷), as well as the axioms that accompany them,
may be used to audit the dynamics of “insiders” and “outsiders.” These
methods help search for the essentials, filtering the noise and clutter of
irrelevant issues that surround them without falling into oversimplification
or extremes. It is in that stage of analysis that jurists and other scholars
will be able to recollect and grasp data for analysis under a Nouveau
Régime that can audit legal analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The justice system of the actual Régime through an overbroad
conception of the person furthers the interest of “insiders” through legal
analysis. The legal analysis of the justice system is a pseudoscience in
which rigorous scientific methods of legal analysis do not exist. The
pseudoscientific nature of the justice system ambiguously defines the
concept of the person in order to have wide margins of interpretations that
generate complexity and high degrees of entropy and disorder that exclude
auditing. It is the duty of all, especially jurists, to understand simple things
deeply from different dimensions. Divide and conquer; break difficult
situations into easier ones.
We must examine issues from several points of view extending the
hermeneutical and qualitative analysis to the quantitative by measuring and
counting the underlying structure of the law: subjects/person, verbs/passive
or active, actions or omission and objects/particular or general victim. We
must advance the identification of structure, its shapes and forms that make
the visual and physical impressions of the world using geometry and then
further work with the uncertain using modern math for a novel auditing
system of legal analysis.
In this path towards a Nouveau Régime based on redefining the de jure
conception of the person by importing the number system from math into a
de facto conception of the person will help reduce complexity while
increasing the reliability of legal analysis.92 A universal legal analysis
92. The mathematical concepts presented are of general knowledge in the
mathematical field; I cannot adjudicate authorship to any particular author or text.
Nevertheless, for a simple reference regarding all of these concepts, see DAVID
NELSON, DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS (3d ed. 2003) and E.T. BELL, MEN OF
MATHEMATICS, THE LIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GREAT MATHEMATICIANS FROM
ZENO TO POINCARÉ (Touchstone Book reprt. 1986) (1937).
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furthers consensus through the conviction that standard reliable audits
provide, and conviction furthers action that is needed for universal
harmony. Finally, Norman Packard once stated, “A physicist is a
mathematician with a feeling for reality,” perhaps one day we might say,
“A jurist is a mathematician with a feeling for social behavior.”93

93. JOHN D. BARROW, THE CONSTANTS
PREDICTORS (2000).
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